Critique of Buterin’s “A Proof of Stake Design Philosophy”

1. “Cost of attack should exceed cost of defense” is illogical

2. No, humans are not “quite good at consensus”

The fable of “belling the cat” is about a group of mice who debate plans to nullify the threat of a marauding cat. Putting a bell around the cat’s neck seems like an obviously good solution, until one mouse asks who will volunteer… The story illustrates how ‘social consensus’ can seem easy in theory, but is often hard in practice.

3. Unsubstantiated claim that PoS is more resilient than PoW

  • Cryptocurrency mining designs are solutions to the problem of trust in systems with imperfect knowledge and unknown adversaries. Proof-of-work has applications in early modern money and in nature, where the handicap principle evolutionarily evolved to let animals prove the “honesty” or reliability of their signal. To my knowledge, proof-of-stake has no equivalent applications in either human history or biology.
  • A PoW 51% attacker can significantly slow down the network, but even a single attempt to revert historical transactions requires a huge and long-running expense. In other words, the production of ledger history is extremely expensive and its disruption arguably even more so.
  • Contrary to a PoW-chain absent a +51% cartel, it’s mathematically proven that it is impossible to determine the “true” transaction history in a PoS blockchain without an additional source of trust. If a source of trust is always needed, a potential pandora’s box of attack and centralization scenarios is opened. This is a seed of truth behind the joke that Ethereum plans to use “proof of Vitalik”.
  • In a naive PoS environment, an attacker can easily create many alternative histories of the ledger, making it cheap to try different strategies. This is known as as the “nothing at stake problem”. Ethereum plans to solve this by destroying the bonded security deposit of malicious validators. SolidX’s Bob McElrath makes the point that the strategy of ‘economic punishment’ of attackers is moot if the punishment itself can be forked away. Another criticism of bonded PoS, as recently voiced by BitTorrent creator Bram Cohen, is the question how one prevents honest stakers from being tricked into interacting with the network in a way that triggers the punishment that is supposed to protect them. (Think of it as the crypto equivalent of large scale swatting.) An alternative attack scenario, suggested by Galois Capital’s Kevin Zhou, is one where the attacker tricks enough honest people onto his network, so that it becomes these honest peoples interest to support the attacking chain as the true chain.





Economist & investor. Mainly Bitcoin.

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Tuur Demeester

Tuur Demeester

Economist & investor. Mainly Bitcoin.

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